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THE ACTION OF INDEBITATUS (GENERAL) ASSUMPSIT-
AT COMMON LAW, UNDER MODERN CODES,
PRACTICE ACTS AND RULES OF COURT
ALISON REPPY*
PART I
OUTLINE
I. Historical Background
The Term "Indebitatus Assumpsit"-Used in Two Senses
Indebitatus Assumpsit as a Remedy to Recover upon an
Express Promise to Pay a Simple Debt
(I) Where the Promise to Pay the Debt was Made
Subsequent to the Time the Debt was Created
(II) An Explanation of Why a Promise Subsequent to
the Creation of the Debt Sued on was Deemed
Essential
(III) Where the Promise to Pay the Debt was Made at
the Time the Debt was Created
Indebitatus Assumpsit as a Remedy to Recover Debts
Where There is No Promise Whatsoever to Pay
(I) Where There was No Express Promise to Pay the
Debt Subsequent to the Time, or at the Time
the Debt was Created
(II) Essential Distinctions and Relationships to be
Kept in Mind in Applying Debt, Special As-
sumpsit and Indebitatus Assumpsit
(III) Is All Contract Law Grounded on a Single Con-
ception?
(IV) Implied and Quasi-Contracts
(V) Indebitatus Assumpsit as a Remedy Upon the
Quantum Meruit and Quantum Valebant
Counts
(VI) The Common Counts
(A) Procedural Advantages to Plaintiff Afford-
ed by the Simplicity of Pleading in Indebita-
tus Assumpsit
(B) Indebitatus Assumpsit as a Remedy for
Customary Duties and Legal Penalties
* Dean and Professor of Law, New York Law School.
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(C) The Indebitatus Count for Money Had
and Received
(1) Distinction Between Common Count for
Money Had and Received and the Other
Common Counts
(2) The Extension of the Common Count
for Money Had and Received is a Substi-
tute for the Older Action of Account
(3) Indebitatus Assumpsit for Money Had
and Received, the Substitute for Account
Versus, the Equitable Bill for an Ac-
counting
(4) Lord Mansfield's Exposition of the
Count for Money Had and Received as in
the Nature of a Bill in Equity
(5) Constructive Contracts-Waiver of Tort
and Suit in Indebitatus Assumpsit for
Money Had and Received
(a) The Incongruity of the Technical
Words of the Count for Money Had
and Received
(b) The Count for Money Had and
Received Becomes Available Where
the Defendant Had Converted the
Plaintiff's Chattels
(6) Limitation Upon Doctrine that Plaintiff
May Waive the Tort and Sue in Assumpsit
for Money Had and Received
(a) The Count for Money Had and Re-
ceived Where the Conversion Con-
sisted in Selling the Chattels and the
Action was to Recover the Proceeds
(b) In the United States There is a Di-
vision of Authority as to When a
Count for Money Had and Received
May be Maintained
(c) Indebitatus Assumpsit in no Form
Will Lie to Recover Damages for a
Merely Destructive Trespass
(VII) Quasi-Contract
(A) Quasi-Contract Grounded on a Record
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(B) Quasi-Contract Grounded on a Custom-
ary, Official or Statutory Duty
(C) Quasi-Contract Grounded Upon the Con-
cept of Unjust Enrichment
(1) Where the Plaintiff Sued for Money
Which the Defendant Acquired by Mis-
conduct
(2) Where the Plaintiff Sued for Money
Paid by Mistake
(3) Where the Plaintiff Sued for Money
Paid as a Result of Undue Influence or
Improper Authority
(4) Where the Plaintiff Sued for Money
Paid on a Consideration Which Had
Wholly Failed
The Action of Indebitatus Assumpsit in Retrospect
II. Scope of the Action
Assumpsit-General or Special
Contracts Implied in Fact and in Law
The Limitations of Indebitatus or General Assumpsit
(I) It is Not Available Where There is No Simple
(Executed) Contract
(II) It is Not Available Where There is no Promise,
Either Express or Implied
(Il) IL is Not Available Where There is No Debt, or
No Obligation Similar to a Debt
sIV) It is Not Available Where the Amount Sought to
Be Recovered is Uncertain
(V) It is Not Available Upon an Executory Express
Contract
III. Express Contracts Not Excluding Indebitatus Assumpsit
(I) Where the Facts Underlying the Express Con-
tract are Equivalent to the Legal Duty Cre-
ated by the Contract
(II) Where the Express Contract has been Fully Ex-
ecuted or Performed
(III) Where the Express Contract has not been Sub-
stantially Executed or Performed
(IV) Where there is an Express Contract and the
Plaintiff has not Substantially Performed
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(V) Where After Part Performance of the Contract,
Further performance is Prevented by an Act
of the Defendant, or by Some Act Which in
Law Operates as a Discharge of the Contract,
or if the Contract is Abandoned or Rescinded
(VI) Where the Contract is Merely Void (Not Illegal),
or Merely Unenforceable, or Voidable, and has
been Voided, there may be a Recovery in Gen-
eral Assumpsit for Part Performance
(VII) Where Additional Work has been done on Request
in Performing a Special Contract
IV. Indebitatus Assumpsit Distinguished From and Concurrent
with Other Actions
V. Forms of Original Writ and Declarations in Indebitatus
(General) Assumpsit
VI. The Common Counts
In General
Varieties of Common Counts
(I) The Indebitatus Counts
(A) The Money Counts
(1) The Count for Money Paid to the De-
fendant's Use
(2) The Count for Money Had and Received
(3) The Count for Money Lent
(4) The Count for Interest Due
(5) The Count Found to be Due on Account
Stated
(B) Other Counts
(1) The Common Count for Use and Occu-
pation
(2) The Count for Board and Lodging
(3) The Count for Land Sold and Conveyed
(4) The Count for Goods Sold and De-
livered
(5) The Count for Goods Bargained and
Sold
(6) The Count for Work, Labor and Ser-
vices
(II) Value Counts
(A) Quantum Meruit
(B) Quantum Valebant
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(C) The Absorption of the Quantum Meruit
and Quantum Valebant Counts into the In-
debitatus Counts
(III) The Common Count on an Account Stated
VII. Contracts of Record and Statutory Liabilities
Action on Judgment
Liability Imposed by Statute
VIII. Essential Allegations in Indebitatus Assumpsit or Common
Counts
IX. Essential Allegations: (1) Statement of an Executed Con-
sideration: Indebitatus Assumpsit
Quantum Meruit and Quantum Valebant Counts
Account Stated
X. Essential Allegations: (2) The Promise
XI. Essential Allegations: (3) The Breach
XII. Essential Allegations: (4) The Damages
XIII. Status Under Modem Codes, Practice Acts and Rules of
Court
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
THE Action of General or Indebitatus Assumpsit1 was created by
extending the Action of Special Assumpsit, which bad developed
out of the tort action of Trespass on the Case Super Se Assumpsit,
into the field of Debt on simple (executed) contract. As. Special
1. In general, on the origin, history and development of the action of General (In-
debitatus) Assumpsit, see:
Treatises: Evans, Essay on the Action for Money Had and Received on the Law of
Insurance, and on Bills and Notes (London 1802; Amer. Ed. by Francis Z. Martin, New-
bern 1802); 1 Chitty, Precedents in Pleading 42 (1st Amer. from 1st London Ed.,
Springfield 1839); Hare, The Law of Contracts, c. XI, Implied Promises 227-240 (Bos-
ton 1887); Keener, A Treatise on the Law of Quasi Contracts, c. III, Waiver of Tort
159-213 (New York 1893); Pomeroy, Code Remedies, c. III, Section Third, § 406, 536
(4th Ed. by Bogle, Boston 1904); Martin, Civil Procedure at Common Law, c. II, Art. InI,
§ 54-58, Assumpsit, (St. Paul 1905); Martin, Civil Procedure at Common Law, Ap-
pendix, Note 1, General Assumpsit for Part Performance of Express Contracts (St. Paul
1905); 3 Street, Foundations of Legal Liability, c. XV, Indebitatus Assumpsit 182 (North-
port 1906); Id. c. VII, The Debt and the Assumpsit 61 (Northport 1906); Id. c. XXI,
XXII, xxIII, XXIV, 199-235; Id. c. XXV, Obligations in the Nature of Assumpsit 235;
Woodward, The Law of Quasi Contract, c. I, Indebitatus Assumpsit 2 (Boston 1913);
3 Holdsworth, History of English Law, c. III, (4) The Extension of the Action to Remedy
the Breach of Implied Contract 446-454 (3rd ed. Boston 1927); Anson, Principles of the
English Law of Contract, c. VIII, Contract and Quasi-Contract 442 (17th ed. Oxford 1929);
Jackson, The History of Quasi-Contract in English Law, Pt. I. Before the Rise of In-
debitatus Assumpsit in the 17th Century; Pt. II, From the Rise of Indebitatus Assumpsit
to the Settlement of the Main Principles (Cambridge 1936); Mcrgan, The Forms of
Action, c. V, Assumpsit, 107 (2d ed. Chicago 1948); Poter, Historical Introduction to
English Law, c. V, Implied Assumpsit 456-461 (London 1948); Maitland, The Forms of
Action, Lecture VI, Assumpsit 69 (Cambridge 1948); Fifoot, History and Sources of the
Common Law, c. 15, The Subsequent Development of Assumpsit, Indebitatus Assumpsit
358-380 (London 1949); Walsh, History of English Law, c. 19, Development of Con-
tract, § 180, Indebitatus Assumpsit 345-350 (2d ed. Indianapolis 1950).
Articles: Holmes, History of Early English Equity, 1 L.Q.Rev. 162 (1885); Adolphus,
The Circuiteers, Eclogue, 1 L.Q.Rev. 232 (1885); McQuillan, Action of Use and Occupa-
tion Against a Trespasser, 23 Cent. L.J. 38' (1886); Ames, Implied Assumpsit, 2 Harv.
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Assumpsit had displayed great adaptability and flexibility in the
process of its development as a modern contract action out of the
various specialized forms of Trespass on the Case, it was shortly
suggested that it might be utilized for the purpose of creating a
still newer form of action which could serve as an alternative mode
of suing for debt.
Once Assumpsit had achieved recognition as a remedy for non-
feasance of undertaking generally, which was assured in 1504, it
was urged upon the Courts that a promise to pay a debt consti-
tuted as much of an undertaking as any other promise, and it was
also as binding, in view of the fact that a pre-existing indebtedness
was a sufficient consideration to support an express promise to pay.
It should be remembered, however, that the action of Debt had
lost some of its effectiveness because it was subject to several seri-
ous procedural defects or handicaps. In the first place, in some
forms of the action, the: defense of Wager of Law was available to
a defendant, and where this was true the action would not lie
against the executors and administrators of the, decedent. 2 More-
over, such a mode of trial was both inconvenient and unsatisfac-
tory, as compared to trial by jury. In the second place, the action
of Debt was subject to the requirement of great particularity in
stating a sum certain to be due in his Declaration,' and any vari-
ation in his proof as to this matter resulted in the loss of the
action.4 And, in the third place, it was not available for the recov-
ery of unliquidated damages for the breach of executory contracts;
L. Rev. 53 (1888); Ames, Assumpsit for Use and Occupation, 2 Harv. L. Rev. 377
(1889); Keener, Waiver of Tort, 6 Harv. L. Rev. 223, 269 (1893); Corbin, Waiver of
Tort and Suit in Assumpsit, 19 Yale L.J. 221 (1910); Beale, Recovery for Work Not
According to Contract, 19 Yale L.J. 669 (1910); King, The Recovery of Money, 40 L.Q.
Rev. 31 (1924); Cohen, Change of Position in Quasi Contracts, 45 Harv L. Rev. 1333
(1923); Langimaid, Quasi-Contract-Change of Position by Receipt of Money in Satis-
faction of a Preexisting Obligation, 21 Calif. L. Rev. 311 (1933); House, Unjust En-
richment: The Applicable Statute of Limitations, 35 Corn. L.Q. 797 (1950); Seavey,
Problems in Restitution, 7 Okla. L. Rev. 257 (1954).
Comments: Pleading: Sufficiency of the Common Counts, 4 Calif. L. Rev. 352
(1915-1916); Pleading: Complaint: Common Counts: Allegation of Promise to Pay
Where Services Are Rendered to Third Party, 21 Calif. L. Rev. 396 (1933); Contracts-
implied Contracts-Implied Warranty in Bailment and Other Non-Sales Contracts, 17
Minn. L. Rev. 210 (1933); Common Counts in Assumpsit Followed by Allegation of
Promise to Pay, 21 Minn. L. Rev. 756 (1937); Contracts: Sales: Property in Ideas:
Ideas as Subject Matter of Express Contract--Implied in Fact and Implied in Law Con-
tracts, 31 Corn. L.Q. 382 (1946).
Annotations: Previous Debtor and Creditor Relationship a Condition of Account Stated,
6 A.L.R. 2d 113 (1949).
2. 1 Holdsworth, History of English Law, c. VII, Courts of a Special Jurisdiction,
307 (3d ed. Boston 1927); Id. 2 History of English Law, C.V., Succession to Chattels,
578 (3d ed. Boston (1927).
3. Dean Ames, in his Lectures on Legal History, Lecture XIV, Implied Assumpsit
149, 153 (Canbridge 1913), said: "In declaring in Debt, except possibly upon an
Account Stated, the plaintiff was 'required to set forth his cause of action with great
particularity."
4., Y.B. 3 Hen. VI Mich, pl. 4 (1425).
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such contracts, to be enforceable, had to be under Seal.5 With the
expansion of the jurisdiction of the royal courts, the applicable
rules as to specific actions became stricter. The effect of such
strictness as to Covenant and Debt operated to prevent a verbal
contract of suretyship from being enforced, as well as any simple
executory contract. In the face of the vacuum thus created and
the resultant demand for a remedy, the ecclesiastical courts, des-
pite a generous use of the writ of prohibition on the- part of the
common-law courts, succeeded in the enforcement of certain parol
contracts over a long period, and equity from time to time, indi-
cated its eagerness to lend a helping hand. To avoid any infringe-
ment ipon its jurisdiction by its two perennial rivals, the common-
law courts bestirred themselves, and, out of the great residuary
delictual remedy of Trespass on the Case, over a period extending
to four hundred years, gradually developed Assumpsit, Special
Assumpsit, and indebitatus (General) Assumpsit. The origin and
history of the latter will now be traced.
The Term "Indebitatus Assumpsit"-Used in Two Senses
THE term "Indcbitatus Assumpsit" has been used in two senses.
In its more restricted sense, it was applied to that form of Assump-
sit which was first in order of development after Special Assumpsit,
and which was that form of Assumpsit which became available for
the recovery of any simple common-law debt; in its broader and
more general sense, the term was descriptive of those forms of As-
sumpsit, which came to be known as the common counts, which,
as we shall see, constituted a final stage in the development of the
action.
Indebtitatus Assumpsit as a Remedy to Recover upon an
Express Promise to Pay a Simple Debt
AssuMPsIT, in the sense of being a Substitute for Debt in the
field of Debt on simple (executed) contract, passed through three
stages of development: (1) where the promise to pay the debt
was made subsequent to the time the debt was created; (2) where
the promise to pay the debt was made at the time the debt was
created, and (3) where there was no promise at all. In all three
instances the existence of an actual debt was required in order to
support Indebitatus Assumpsit. Let us, therefore, consider these
5, Professor Holdsworth suggests that this defect may have been mitigated to some
extent by the fact that the Borough Courts and the Local Courts enforced many covenants
which were not under Seal. 2 History of English Law, c.nIII, Contracts and Quasi-Contract
423, 424 (3d ed. Boston 1927).
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stages through which Indebitatus Assumpsit, in its narrow sense,
passed.
(I) Where the Promise to Pay the Debt was Made Subsequent
to the Time the Debt was Created. - When, toward the middle
of the Sixteenth Century,6 the Lawyers and Judges undertook to
extend the newly developed Action of Special Assumpsit into the
field of Debt on simple (executed) contract, the first step consisted
in persuading a Court to hold that where there was a preexisting
debt, and the debtor, subsequent to the time of its creation, made
an express promise to pay, Assumpsit would lie." In this action,
the plaintiff alleged that the defendant, being indebted (indebi-
tatus) did promise (assumpsit). It will be observed, therefore,
that in the method of declaring, thus recognized as legitimate, the
debt was alleged only as the fact of indebtedness by reason of
some form of simple (exented) contract, such as work done,
money lent or goods sold, which enabled the plaintiff to evade the
Debt requirement of extreme particularity in setting forth the
sum due." Thereafter, the action proceeded upon the promise and
not the factual situation which created the debt, that is, not upon
the contract. As a consequence of this, the plaintiff became en-
titled to a trial by jury and thus evaded trial by wager of law. Hav-
ing managed to obtain a promise to pay, the plaintiff was in a
position to make truthful allegations, and could prove these facts
in the form alleged. When, therefore, the allegation of an express
promise ceased to be essential in the new action, then in process of
development, the Latin forms of two vital words used in the decla-
ration were taken as the name of the new action, which thereby
became known as Indebitatus Assumpsit.
Returning to the early requirement of an express promise sub-
sequent to the date on which the debt was created, it is interesting
to note the circumstances and occasion for the first appearance of
this innovation. As the Court of King's Bench, or Queen's Bench, as
it was called when a Queen was reigning, ordinarily only had jur-
isdiction over crimes and torts akin to crimes, originally it had no
jurisdiction over actions of Debt. Since, however, the Action of
Special Assumpsit, in its origin and for at least a century there-
after," was still regarded as a form of the tort action of Trespass on
,-6.. Brooke, Abridgment, Accion sur Casem pl. 105 (London 1573), citing an unre-
ported case from 33 Hen. III (1542); Id. pl. 5.
7: Anonymous, Dal. 84, pl. 35.
8, Ames, Lectures on Legal History, Lecture XIV, Implied Assumpsit 150 (Cam-
bridge 1913).
.9. In 1665, in the case of Wirrel v. Brand, 1 Lev. 165, 83 Eng. -Rep. 351 (1665),
Lv:r vj;,.4 a question as to whether Assumpsit was in contract or tort, Even today in
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the Case, a recognition by that court that Assumpsit was a proper
remedy for the recovery of debts, would enable it to expand its
jurisdiction at the expense of its two rivals, the Courts of Ex-
chequer and Common Pleas. And that is exactly what happened.
The story of this development began, according to Brooke,10
with a case said to have been decided in the year 1535, in which
the courts had purportedly recognized that an existing legal duty
was sufficient consideration to support an express promise. He
said: "If one who is indebted to me Promises to Pay before Mi-
chaelmas, I may have an Action of Debt on the Contract or an
Action on the Case upon the Promise [Special Assumpsit]; and the
point is different, for Debt does not lie upon a Promise." What was
meant was that if a debtor promised his creditor to pay a debt
owing by him, the creditor might sue in Special Assumpsit upon
his express promise, and by so doing avoid the necessity of suing
in Debt, thus depriving his debtor of the dubious right to trial by
wager of law, while, at the same time, permitting the creditor to
escape from the Debt requirement that the declaration must allege
as due a sum certain. This development was fraught with deep
significance for what we now speak of as modem contract law.
This was the situation where twenty-three years later, or in 1558,
the case of Norwood v. Reed"l was decided and in which it was
suggested that "every Contract Executory, is an Assumpsit 2 in it-
self.",:
In 1773, in the case of Edwards v. Burr, 4 the Court of Queen's
Bench held that proof of a simple contract debt even without an
express promise, would support an Indebitatus Assumpsit. This
view of the Court of Queen's Bench, first to sanction this innova-
tion, was opposed by other courts for many years, the Court of
Exchequer Chamber on several different occasions reversing judg-
some jurisdictions the Declaration in Assumpsit still reflects its delictual origin in alleging
that the defendant undertook or promised. And the correct legal denomination of Assump-
sit is Trespass on the Case on Promises. Carrol v. Green, 92 U.S. 509, 23 L. Ed. 738
(1875). Moreover, the general issue of the action is Non Assumpsit, which has a conp-
rehensive scope beyond that of other general issues, which fact has been generally ac-
counted for by the fact that originally the thing denied was the fraud imputed to the
defendant.
10. The judgment first appeared in 1568, being published posthumously, Winfield,
The Chief Sources of English Legal History, c. VIII, Judgments 252 (Cambridge 1925).
11. 1 Plowd. 180, 75 Eng. Rep. 287 (1899).
12. There was a fundamental difference between Assumpsit and Contract. In Fernes
de la Ley it is said: "Ass-umpsit is a voluntary promise made by word, by which a man
assumes and takes upon himself to perform or pay to another. This word contains in it
any verbal promise upon consideration." "Contract is a bargain or covenant between twa
parties, where one thing is given for another, which is called quid pro quo."
13. Norwood v. Reid, 1 Plowd. 181, 183, 75 Eng. Rep. 277, 279 (1558).
14. Dal. 104, pl. 45 (1773).
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ments against a debtor in the Queen's Bench upon an implied as-
sumpsit."
In 1588, in the case of Manwood v. Burston,5 three considera-
tions'" were listed as sufficient to support Assumpsit: "1. A debt
precedent; 2. where he to whom such a promise is made is damni-
fied by doing anything, or spends his labor at the instance of the
promisor, although no benefit comes to the promisor . . . ; 8. A
present consideration."'
In the Manwood case, Manwood himself, the Chief Baron of the
Court of Exchequer, was the plaintiff. And in his argument be-
fore the Court of Exchequer Chamber, in which he enumerated
the considerations above set forth, he also stressed the great ad-
vantage to the plaintiff in being permitted to ground his case in
Assumpsit instead of forcing him to bring Debt. He declared that
in suing on the promise, it is not essential "to show any certainty
of the contract or other circumstance or how or in what manner
the debt did accrue or begin."" It was sufficient merely to allege
the existence of the debt and that in consideration thereof the de-
fendant promised. If, however, he brought Debt, the pleader was
apt to meet a pitfall by failing to describe the circumstances ac-
curately or to state correctly that a sum certain was due. And fail-
ure on this score meant failure to recover.20
Two years after the decision in the Manwood case, in the famous
case of Maylard v. Kester,2' in an action on the Case in Assumpsit,
the plaintiff alleged that in consideration that he wished to sell
and deliver to the defendant certain goods, the defendant under-
took to pay for them a certain price, that the plaintiff did sell and
deliver the goods, and that the defendant did not pay in accord-
ance with his aforesaid promise and undertaking. The defendant
pleaded, Non Assumpsit. At the trial, there was a verdict and
15. Hinson v. Baradge, Moo. 701, 72 Eng. Rep. 670 (1595); Forges v. Beacher,
Moo. 694, 72 Eg. Rep. 845 (1595); Paranious v. Payne, Mov. 703, FV. Eng. 852
(1595); Maylard v. Kester, Mov. 711, 72 Eng. Rep. 857 (1598).
16. 2 Leon. 203, 74 Eng. Rep. 479 (1588).
17. In Joscelrin v. Sheldon, 2 Leon. 4, 74 Eng. Rep. 503 (1557), the promise was
described as made "in consideration of" etc. But see, article by Ames, The History of
Assumpsit, 2 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 18, note 1 (1888).
18. Manwood v. Burston, 2 Leon. 203, 204, 74 Eng. Rep. 479, 480 (1588).
19. Manawood v. Burston, 2 Leon. 203, 204, 74 Eng. Rep. 479, 480 (1588).
20. As previously observed, in the early development stages of Indebitatus (Generai)
Assumpsit, it was essential to show that an express promise to pay the debt was act-
nally made after the debt was created. Thus, in the case of Ashbrooke v. Snape, Cor.
Eliz. 240, 78 Eng. Rep. 496 (1591), decided five years after the Mannwood Case, re-
covery was allowed upon a subsequent promise to pay a debt evidenced by a sealed in-
strument, a course wholly unnecessary, as Trial by Wager of Law was not permitted in
Debt on a Specialty. In short, the original reason for extending Assumpsit-because Debt
on simple (executed) contract was subject to Wager of Law-here had no application.
And proof of this may be gathered from the fact the decision was not followed.
21. Moo. 711, 72 Eng. Rep. 857 (1600).
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judgment for the plaintiff. On writ of error, however, the judg-
ment was reversed, as the court said, "because Debt properly
lay and not an Action on the Case [Assumpsit], the matter of the
pleading proving a perfect Sale and Contract."22 Two years later,
as an incident of the decision in Slade's Case,22 the liberal view as
frequently expounded by the Court of Queen's Bench, was ap-
proved, all the Justices of England, as well as the Barons of the
Exchequer, holding that the law, - by operation of law - raised
an assumpsit (promise) upon the creation of every simple debt.
(II) An Explanation of Why a Promise Subsequent to the
Creation of the Debt Sued on was Deemed Essential. - Why was
the subsequent promise deemed necessary? For sixty years before
Slade's Case, according to Dean Ames, the courts had refused to
permit an action of Assumpsit upon a promise made in consider-
ation of a precedent debt.24 Why then, during the same period,
should they refuse to sanction the action, when the receipt of the
quid pro quo was contemporaneous with or subsequent to the
promise? Dean Ames attributes this anomaly to a peculiar char-
acteristic of Debt, which is frequently overlooked, that is, that both
a debt created by simple (executed) contract as well as one cre-
ated by specialty, was originally regarded and treated as a grant,2'2
and not as a promise. As we saw in the discussion of Debt, it was,
in its origin a real as opposed to a personal action; its object was
not the recovery of damages, but a debt, consisting of a specific
res, such as a chattel or money. It was just this very characteristic
which caused Vaughan, J., in Edgecomb v. Dye,"5 to speak dis-
paragingly of Assumpsit as compared to Debt, and to declare that
the rule that every contract executory implied a Promise as "a
false gloss, thereby to turn Actions of Debt into Actions on the
Case; for Contracts of Debt are reciprocal Grants,"21 and thus
avoid the incidents of wager of law. But the real point was that
since Debt was recognized as the remedy for an obligation cre-
ated by an agreement or promise to pay a sum certain in exchange
for a quid pro quo, to also permit an action of Assumpsit grounded
on the same engagement could not be regarded as proper, as such
a course of action involved an admission that "two legal relations,
22. Maylard v. Kester, Moo. 711, 72 Eng. Rep. 857 (1600).
23. 4 Co. 92b, 76 Eng. Rep. 1074 (1603).
24. It is said that "no case has been found recognizing the validity of a promise 'to
pay' a precedent debt before 1542." Ames, Lectures on Legal History, Lecture xInI,
Express Assumpsit, 128 (Cambridge 1913).
25. See Chawner v. Bowes, Godb. 217, 78 Eng. Rep. 132 (1613).
26. Vaugh. 39, 124 Eng. Rep. 984 (1664).
27. Edgecomb v. Dee, 89, 101, 124 Eng. Rep. 984, 990 (1664).
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fundamentally distinct, might be produced by one and the same
set of words."2 8 From their viewpoint it seemed better to treat
the force of the words employed in reaching an agreement as hav-
ing been spent in creating the debt, and, of course, if this assump-
tion be accepted, it followed logically that on such a factual sit-
uation, if the creditor desired to charge his debtor in Indebitatus
Assumpsit, he was under the necessity of alleging a new promise
subsequent to the time the debt was created.
Street explained this anomaly in a slightly different way. He
said that the creation of most debts involved the making of a
promise in fact, but it was conceived that the force and effect of
this original promise was exhausted in creating the debt. It, there-
fore, required a new promise to revive the obligation. Accordingly,
it was said that from the debt now in existence would be raised,
by operation of law, an implied promise on which Indebitatus As-
sumpsit might be supported. Stated in another way, the
original liability arose from a promise in fact agreed to by the
parties. Upon the liability thus erected the law superimposes a
new sort of liability predicated upon a promise implied by law.
Such liability was, says Street, similar to but not quite identical
with that enforced by Debt and Special Assumpsit.
2
'
When actions of Assumpsit multiplied in number it became more
difficult to distinguish between promises to pay money and promises
to do other things. The agreement to pay money for a quid pro
quo, as Dean Ames has pointed out, had a double aspect. From
one viewpoint it was regarded as a grant, while from another it
was regarded as a promise. When this situation was blurred, and
the courts began recggnition of them in their duel aspect, the
availability of Indebitatus Assumpsit, with its procedural advant-
ages, as a concurrent remedy with Debt, became inevitable. And
this brings us to our second situation.
(III) Where the Promise to Pay the Debt was Made at the
Time the Debt was Created.- When it was finally held that As-
sumpsit could be extended to enforce a liability to pay a debt
where the promise to pay was made after the debt was created,
that still left a plaintiff without any remedy where the promise to
pay was made at the moment the debt was created, or where the
defendant received the goods, the money or other form of emolu-
28. Ames, Lectures on Legal History, c. XV, Implied Assumpsit, 148, 151 (Ca.-
bridge 1913).
29. 3 Street, Foundation of Legal Liability, c. XV, The Action of Indebitatus Assump-
sit 184 (Northport 1906).
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ment; it failed to provide a remedy for simple debts where there
was no promise at all; and, of course, it did not cover the situation
where there was neither a true common law debt nor a promise,
yet where work, labor or services had been supplied under such
circumstances as to require payment therefor.
How then, was the situation to be resolved where there was no
promise to pay the debt made subsequent to or at the time the
debt was created? This was the very issue presented in Slade's
Case"0 in 1603, in which A brought assumpsit and alleged that be-
ing possessed of certain land amounting to eight acres, be had
sowed the same with wheat and rye, which had grown into blades,
that the defendant B, in consideration that A, at his request, had
bargained and sold to him the said blades of wheat and rye, grow-
ing upon the land, assumed and promised the plaintiff to pay
therefor, and that the defendant, B, had not paid for the wheat and
rye. After a plea of Non Assumpsit, the case went to trial, and on
a special verdict, it was found "that between the plaintiff and de-
fendant there was no other Promise or Assumption but only the
said bargain."
The issue thus presented was whether Indebitatus Assumpsit
would lie upon proof of a simple contract debt, where no promise
to pay the debt was given at the time the debt was created?
On this issue the Courts of Exchequer Chamber and Common
Pleas had long been divided, the former, holding that Assumpsit
would not lie, the latter, that it would. It is said that this division
of opinion between the two Courts came to the attention of Queen
Elizabeth who demanded that "for the Honour of the Law" the
issue should be decided. And accordingly all the Justices of Eng-
land and the Barons of the Exchequer heard the argument, after
which these points were resolved: "1. That although an Action of
Debts lies upon the Contract, yet the bargainor may have an
Action on the Case, [Indebitatus Assumpsit], or an Action of Debt
at his election . .. 3. It was resolved, that every Contract Execu-
tory imports in itself an assumpsit, for when one agrees to pay
money, or to deliver anything, thereby he Assumes or Promises to
Pay, or deliver it, and therefore when one sells any goods to an-
other, and agrees to deliver them at a day to come, and the other
in Consideration thereof agrees to pay so much money at such a
day, in that case both parties may have an Action of Debt, or an
Action on the Case in assumpsit, for the Mutual Executory Agree-
30. 4 Co. 92b, 76 Eng. Rep. 1074 (1603).
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ment of both parties imports in itself Reciprocal Actions upon the
Case, as well as Actions of Debt, and therewith agrees the Judg-
ment in Read and Norwood's Case, P1. Com. 128."1
Street, in reference to this decision in Slade's Case, states: "This
holding proceeds on the idea that the creation of a simple debt can
be viewed in a double aspect, viz., (1) as originating a Contractual
Duty on which Debt will lie; and (2) as imparting a Promise on
which Assumpsit can be maintained.
-3 2
Lord Coke expressed the whole idea in the following language:
"Every Contract Executory imports in itself an Assumpsit
[promise], for when one agrees to pay money, or to deliver any-
thing, thereby he assumes or Promises to Pay, or Deliver it, and
therefore when one sells any goods to another and agrees to de-
liver them at a day to come, and the other in Consideration thereof
agrees to pay so much money at such a day, in that case both par-
ties may have an Action of Debt, or an Action on the Case on As-
sumpsit [Special Assumpsitl; for the Mutual Executory Agreement
of both parties imparts in itself reciprocal Actions upon the Case
[Special Assumpsit] as well as Actions of Debt."'
Dean Ames regarded the decision in Slade's Case as a great vic-
tory for the Court of King's Bench, in the sense that it vastly ex-
tended its jurisdiction. That court had had no jurisdiction by
original writ in an action of Debt. If Assumpsit, which had its
origin in and -developed out, of the tort action of Trespass on the
Case Super Se Assumpsit, were extended to include suits upon
debts, the Court of King's Bench was to exercise a jurisdiction
never before enjoyed.
It should be kept in mind, however, in assessing the true signifi-
cance of Slade's Case, that Indebitatus Assumpsit did not, like
Special Assumpsit, create a new substantive right-the right to
sue for breach of a modern express contract-it merely provided
the creditor with a new form of procedural relief, not subject to
wager of law and not subject to the requirement of great particu-
larity in alleging a sum certain to be due; it was, in short, merely
a substitute remedy for the Action of Debt.
Perhaps the result of what happened in Slade's Case may be
explained more realistically than was done by the court. Thus, it
has been said that the mere incurring of the indebtedness implied
31. Slade's Case, 4 Co. 92b, 76 Eng Rep. 1074 (1603).
32. 2 Street, Foundations of Legal Liability, c. VII, Debt and Assumpsit 61, 62-63
(Northport 1906).
33. Slade's Case, 4 Co. 92b, 94, 76 Eng. Rep. 1074, 1077 (1603).
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a promise to pay it, as every man was by law presumed to be
honest and to intend the fulfillment of his obligation, hence every
debtor was, in legal contemplation, regarded as perpetually prom-
ising to pay what he legally owed. His failure to pay, therefore,
constituted, by operation of law, a breach of the promise which
had thus been legally imputed to him. It followed logically, there-
fore, that a proof of a debt amounted to proof of a promise to pay,
and hence nonpayment was a breach for which Assumpsit was the
proper remedy. So construed, the effect of Slade's Case was to
firmly establish the principle, that where the promise to pay was
made simultaneously with the creation of the debt, or at the time
when the debt was contracted, Indebitatus Assumpsit, as well as
Debt, would lie, at the election of the plaintiff, without the neces-
sity of alleging a new promise made after the debt was created,
which brings us to our third situation, but which is treated as
situation number one under the second division of our subject,
which follows immediately hereinafter.
Indebitatus Assumpsit as a Remedy to Recover Debts Where
There is No Promise Whatsoever to Pay
(I) Where there was No Express Promise to Pay the Debt
Subsequent to the Time, or at the Time the Debt was Created.-
In the thirty years following the decision in Slade's Case, there was
a further development of principle. Prior to the decision in Slade's
Case it was possible for a plaintiff to recover in Assumpsit (1)
where the promise to pay the debt, was made subsequent to the
time of its creation; and (2) where the promise to pay the, debt
was made at the same moment the debt was created. This was a
substantial advance in the remedial law, but it still failed to give
relief (1) where there was no promise whatsoever to pay the debt;
and (2) where the obligation sought to be recovered did not con-
stitute a true common-law debt.
As stated above, situations developed where the parties did not
reduce their transaction to the form of a distinct bargain. Thus,
services were frequently rendered by a cobbler, a common carrier,
an innkeeper or a tailor or by many other workmen, where there
was no advance agreement as to the value of the services thus ren-
dered. Yet there was a tacit understanding on the part of the
parties involved that such services were to be paid for. In such a
factual situation Debt would not lie, for there was no sum certain
due; 4 and Assumpsit was not available as there was no express
34. Young v. Ashburnham, 3 Leon. 161, 74 Eng. Rep. 606, (1578).
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promise.31 To raise, by operation of law, a promise to pay so much
as the plaintiff reasonably deserved for his goods or services, in
order to fill this gap in remedial law, as Dean Ames observes, it
was necessary "to break with the most venerable traditions."3 The
final result, therefore, was that the action came to lie upon the
wholly fictitious promise which the law imputed to the debtor in
those cases where the factual transaction involved operated to
create a debt, or, to state the matter in another way, in any case of
a simple contract executed in such a manner as to confer a benefit
upon one party at the expense of another.
It was, therefore, at this point in the history of procedural law
that the so-called fictitious promise in Indebitatus Assumpsit enters
upon the stage of legal history to assist in completing the process
of extending the action of Assumpsit into the field of obligation,
where there was no express promise to pay the debt subsequent to
or at the time the debt was created, or where there was no promise
at all, and yet, where there was a obligation which the debtor was
under a duty to pay, a duty created by operation of law. How was
the next step to be taken? In the first two stages of the develop-
ment the plaintiff had been required to allege an express promise as
a symbol of the obligation sought to be enforced. To the early
common-law mind there always had to be some symbol to indicate
an obligation, such as a sea! in Covenant, a quid pro quo in Debt,
an express promise in Special Assumpsit. What then was to be the
symbol to mark the next step? How was an obligation to pay a
debt, created by operation of law, to be described in the pleadings?
Something like the following took place. It was said that the de-
fendant owed a debt, that being so indebted, it was not too much
to assume that he intended to pay what he lawfully owned, hence,
he might be regarded as promising to pay what he owed, and if a
man promised to pay what he owed and then failed to do so, he
had breached his promise, upon which Indebitatus Assumpsit
would lie. What was being described by this fictitious promise,
however, was an obligation, a debt created by operation of law,
at the basis of which, although somewhat disguised was a simple
(executed) consideration giving rise to a common-law obligation,
similar to but not quite identical with a true debt.
(II) Essential Distinctions and Relationships to be Kept in
Mind in Applying Debt, Special Assumpsit and -Indebitatus As-
35. Ames, Lectures on Legal History, Lecture XV, Implied Assumpsit 148, 154
(Cambridge 1913).
36. Id. at 154.
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sumpsit. - In order to make clear the process by which Indebita-
tus Assumpsit became a remedy for the enforcement of obligations
created by operation of law, perhaps something should be'.:said
about the relationship of the actions of Debt, Special Assumpsit
and General Assumpsit, their scope, and the theory on which each
proceeds as a form of contractual remedy. An understanding of
the application and theory of these actions presupposes an under-
standing of the various factual situations which will support these
respective actions.
Thus, it is said that General Assumpsit was created by extend-
ing Special Assumpsit into the field of Debt on simple (executed)
contract. First, then, what was the fundamental basis of Debt? As
we have seen in the chapter on the'action of Debt, it was the
remedy for what was known and referred to as a simple executed
contract, resulting in the transfer of a quid pro quo from the credi-
tor to the debtor, and was not available, where the plaintiff had to
rely on a parol promise of the defendant, on an obligation fixed by
an agreement, on a sealed obligation, or on mutual promises.
Second, when did Special Assumpsit lie? Answer, it lay for the
breach of an express contract. In this connection, it is well to keep
clearly in mind that there are two varieties of express contracts
which pass current under this title, one form being an express con-
tract created by the use of spoken or written words, the other
form being an express contract created or inferred in whole or in
part from expressions or conduct other than words on the part of
the promisor, it being a question of fact whether or not in a par-
ticular case a promise should be inferred. In such case the promise
inferred is said to be a promise, implied in fact, but it is neverthe-
less an express contract. Third, when did Indebitatus lie? Answer,
when the so-called promise sued upon was no promise at all in the
sense of requiring the assent of the parties involved; where the
promise sued upon was said to be implied in law, by which is
meant that neither the words nor the conduct of the debtor is
promissory in form or justifies, any inference of a promise; where
the obligation sued upon is one created by operatiom of law, im-
posing upon the debtor a legally enforceable duty to pay, which
is just as effective as if he had in fact expressly promised.
It follows therefore that when Special Assumpsit was extended
into the field of Debt on simple contract, by use of the device
known as "the fictitious promise in Assumpsit," there was in reality
no promise at all, fictitious or otherwise; as the basis of liability,
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there was a debt created by an executed consideration- by the
delivery of a quid pro quo from the creditor to the debtor-which,
for the purposes of pleading and to bridge the procedural gap
where there was in reality no promise at all. It, the fiction, was
used to describe, a debt created by operation of law, by resort to
the fictitious allegation that the defendant, being indebted, pro-
mised to pay, with the averment of nonpayment of the debt being
treated as if it were a breach of promise. Such fictitious promise
was and is, therefore, merely descriptive of an obligation to pay,
which obligation was created by operation of law; it is fictitious
only in the sense that it was not a promise actually made. More-
over, even if there had been an actual promise, it need not
have been proven in an action of Indebitatus Assumpsit.
The effective promise in that action flows from the fact
of indebtedness, which indebtedness is merely the result of a
simple (executed) contract, which lies at the basis of Debt in dis-
guise, and upon which the law raises a so-called promise to pay,
which implied promise is purely a remedial fiction. The breach,
as said before, consists of the nonpayment of the debt, and the
allegation of nonpayment of the debt is treated as if the, plaintiff
had actually alleged a breach of promise. The fictitious promise as
alleged therefore, is in reality a procedural device whereby the
plaintiff sets forth a legal conclusion, inferred from the prior state-
ment of fact showing an indebtedness.
The rule as finally established, then, is that Indebitatus Assump-
sit lies upon a promise implied in law, but this is true only if such
promise is clearly distinguished from promises implied in fact. To
draw the distinction carefully and correctly, one must keep in mind
the distinctions which flow from certain factual patterns. Thus, the
defendant, B, may have agreed to buy ten cords of wood from A,
the plaintiff, at five dollars per cord, and he may have agreed to
pay for the same upon delivery. When, therefore, B refuses to pay
'upon delivery, he breaches an express promise. In many cases, how-
ever, there is no express promise to pay, but there may have been
a long course of dealing between the parties from which a promise
to pay may be inferred. A promise such as this, based upon a tacit
understanding between the, parties that the buyer will compensate
the seller for what he buys, is often spoken Of as an implied pro-
mise, but note that it is a promise inferred as a fact from the char-
acter of the transaction which took place between the parties and
the general understanding as to the practice in sales. Indebitatus
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Assumpsit did not proceed upon either of these two types of pro-
mises, that is, upon an express promise growing out of spoken or
written words, or upon a promise or agreement implied in fact
from the conduct of the parties, which is also an express contract.
At the trial the obligation which the plaintiff sues upon the Indebi-
tatus Assumpsit could not be sustained by proof of an express pro-
mise or a promise implied in fact, or from the course of dealing
which took place between the parties.
The so-called promise, the implied promise, the fictitious pro-
raise, the 6perative promise upon which the plaintiff seeks to re-
cover in Indebitatus Assumpsit, is a promise implied or imputed by
law to every debtor, who, in contemplation of law, is presumed to
be constantly promising to pay what he legally owes. Such pro-
mise, which is merely descriptive of the obligation of the defend-
ant to, pay, as created by operation of law, is a legal conclusion
applicable to every case of indebtedness; it requires no express
contract, or a contract by implication in fact; it is a corollary of the
duty to pay debts, having nothing whatever to do with the manner
and form of dealing which resulted in the creation of the debt. And
this implied promise to pay is not to be confused with the tacit
assurance of payment which is inferred as a fact from a course of
conduct between the parties resulting in a debt, and which is fre-
quently referred to as an implied promise, meaning, however, an
implied promise in fact. It may also be true that the indebtedness
implies a promise to pay, but this sort of implication of fact differs
from the implication which arises out of borrowing money or pur-
chasing goods.
In this connection it may be possible for the same factual situ-
ation to give rise to a promise implied in fact and a promise fin-
plied in law. Thus, if A goes to B's restaurant and orders a meal
listed on the menu at two dollars, and eats the meal and then re-
fuses to pay for it, it might be said that a promise to pay, while
not express, was to be inferred from the conduct of the parties and
the usual course of commercial dealing. This would be a promise
implied in fact, for which the remedy would be Special Assumpsit,
requiring allegations of a promise, consideration, performance: of
conditions, if any, breach and damages. But now if we take the
view that the defendant A owes B a debt, then since the law im-
putes a promise by every debtor who owes a debt, we may say that
Indebitatus Assumpsit lies. In this case, however, the action pro-
ceeds on an entirely different theory, requiring that the plaintiff
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allege that the defendant, being indebted, promised to pay, and
then failed to do so. In such case the fictitious allegation that the
defendant promised to pay is not descriptive of the actual promise
where the promise is express or implied in fact, but is descriptive
of an obligation on the part of the debtor that he is under a legal
duty to pay, which obligation is in no way related to a promise,
but is one created by operation of law.
We have, therefore, three classes of relations which are indis-
criminately referred to as contracts: (1) express contracts, created
by express promises; (2) implied contracts, which arise under cir-
cumstances which, according to the ordinary course of dealing and
the common understanding of men, show a mutual intent to con-
tract; such contracts are what are known and referred to as con-
tracts implied in fact and which are express contracts; and (3)
constructive contracts, which are fictions of law, adopted to, en-
force legal duties, where no proper contract, either express or im-
plied in fact, exists; 7 the so-called promise implied in law, which
is here involved, is merely a procedural fiction, invoked for the
purpose of permitting Indebitatus Assumpsit to serve as! , substi-
tute for Debt in the recovery of a simple debt in disguise. By use
of the ambiguous term "implied contracts," as descriptive of the
kind of contract or obligation sued upon in General Assumpsit,
without carefully observing the distinctions adverted to above,
great confusion in legal thinking has frequently resulted, as it
seems reasonably clear to assert that the action of Indebitatus As-
sumpsit proceeds, not upon contracts implied in fact, but upon a
promise imposed upon every debtor, by operaton of law, and
where there is involved no real or promisorial contract, express or
implied.
(III) Is All Contract Law Grounded on a Single Conception?
- It has long been thought that the conception of the obligation
of promise constitutes the notion which lies at the root of the Law
of contracts; all contract law is now said to be, reducible to this one
idea. In short, according to Street, "The Obligation of Promise is
looked upon as a sort of menstrum in which all other forms of
Contractual Obligation have gradually dissolved."", Such a gen-
eralization is the fruit of that unnatural yet necessary extension of
the action of Special Assumpsit into the field of Debt on simple
executed contract through the development of Indebitatus (Gen-
37. Hertzog v. Hertzog, 29 Pa. 465 (1857).
38. 2 Foundations of Legal Liability; c. VIi, The Debt and the Assumpsit 04,, 65
(Northport 1906).
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eral) Assumpsit, in order to escape from the procedural defects of
the action of Debt, to wit, wager of law, and the requirement of
extreme particularity in stating to be due a sum certain. As a re-
sult of this unnatural development our modern law of contract has
been grounded upon two different conceptions instead of one-
the idea of contractual duty imposed by law and the modem con-
ception of the obligation of promise.
How did this come about? The answer is the Indebitatus As-
sumpsit swallowed up the action of Debt, and Slade's Case was the
occasion on which the development took place. Overlooked, how-
ever, was the fact that this famous case involved a point of reme-
dial rather than substantive law. In attempting to free simple con-
tract law, in the modern law sense, from simple contract law, in
the common law sense, or as created by a simple (executed) con-
tract, the courts were impelled to rule that upon the creation of a
simple debt the -law would raise an implied promise, which after
all, is merely descriptive of an obligation raised by operation of
law, of such a character as would support the action of indebitatus
assumpsit. Once this step had been taken in Slade's Case, Debt, as
a remedy upon the early common law concept of a simple, (exe-
cuted) contract, vanished to all practical intents and purposes.
Thus, it was said that Indebitatus (General) Assumpsit became a
substitute for Debt, but this idea should have been limited to In-
debitatus Assumpsit as it stood at the close of its second stage of
development, and before it had, through the use of a fiction, been
extended into the field of quasi contracts, as a remedy for obli-
gations similar to. but not quite identical with true debts, as created.
by the physical passage of a quid pro quo from the plaintiff to the
defendant. The substitution of Indebitatus Assumpsit for Debt,
which led to the improper inclusion of true and untrue, debts, re-
sulted in the occultation or hiding from view the concept of liabi-
lity which was at the root of Debt, but it did not succeed in des-
troying that concept.
What has been the result? Utter confusion, between the con-
cept of debt as created by a simple executed contract, in the com-
mon law sense and the conception of the obligation of promise, as
understood in the modern contract sense. In consequence lawyers,
judges and professors of law have talked about the implied pro-
mise, which, at the second stage of the development, was nor-
mally the foundation of the action of Indebitatus Assumpsit, losing
sight of the implied promise as a basis of quasi contractual relief,
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until they have come to regard these conceptions of liability the
same as in the judiciary engagement by actual promise. What the
student must constantly keep in mind in studying modem contract
law is that "in dealing with the mysterious Implied Promise, he is
really in contact with the simple [Common-law] debt in disguise."
The so-called promise was and is a pure remedial fiction, indulged
in as in incident of extending the scope of the action of Indebitatus
Assumpsit, and, in consequence, it "sheds a false light on the sub-
sequent history of Contract, because it so, easily gives rise to the
misleading inferences that the conception of the debt has been su-
perseded and extinguished by the notion of the Obligation of Pro-
mise.";9
(IV) Implied and Quasi-Contracts.-There has been consid-
erable confusion in the professional mind concerning the duties
grouped under these two heads. This has resulted largely from the
fact that the concept of the word "Contract" carries with it the
idea of an assumptual ties, or an obligation created by a promise.
Since the extension of Assumpsit, by means of the fiction of an
implied promise, into the field of quasi-contract, where the remedy
did not by nature belong, the conception of the assumptual pro-
mise has been emphasized at the expense of the earlier conception
of contractual duty which is embodied in a true common-law debt.
Since this concealment of Debt was due to procedural defects in
the action and not inivolved with fundamental principle, it follows
that in order to ascertain the true basis of liability in the area
where this anomalous extension of Assumpsit has occurred, it is
necessary to brush away the artificial superstructure and bring to
the surface the fundamental conception which lies at the root of
quasi-contractual liability. If we view the so-called implied and
quasi contracts as a natural and necessary extension of the con-
ception of contractual duty arising out of a common law debt, they
fall into an harmonious and understandable system; but if they
are viewed as an extension of the assumptual obligation, they are
for most part anomalous and in plainest violation of fundamental
principles. If we keep in mind that in all implied and quasi con-
tracts the promise is a mere figment of the legal mind, a procedural
fiction to bridge the gap between the second and third stages of
the development of Indebitatus Assumpsit, it becomes apparent
that in this field neither assumptual capacity on the part of the
person on whom the duty is imposed, nor his actual consent is
39. Id. at 66.
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necessary to the creation of the Contract. It thus becomes futile
to attempt to bring these duties into harmony with the theory un-
derlying Indebitatus Assumpsit.
In Young v. Ashburnham,0 decided in 1578, an innkeeper
supplied lodging to a "gentleman of quality," but as the price of
the service was not agreed upon, it was held that Debt would not
lie. As there was no express promise Special Assumpsit was not
available, and Indebitatus Assumpsit on a Quantum Meruit Count
was not yet in existence. According to, Street,41 this gap in the
remedial law was soon corrected by a twofold development of
legal theory. First, the transaction similar to, that in the Young Case
was said to raise a legal duty in the nature of a debt -an obliga-
tion similar to but not quite identical with a true common law
debt. Second, in order to satisfy this duty implied by law, the so-
called fictitious promise was invoked, thus making it possible for
an innkeeper to recover such sum as he was reasonably entitled to
in Indebitatus Assumpsit. The enforcement of such duty was said
to be in consimili casu with Debt.42
Street declares that the principle underlying this extension of
the conception of contractual liability, may be stated as follows:
"Where the circumstances of any particular transactions show 6tat
a benefit has been conferred by one person on another, either in
the form of service done or goods supplied, and it further appears
that such benefit was conferred at the request of the person bene-
fited, or with his consent,.3 express or implied, the Law will Impose
a Duty to Pay for such benefit. The duty' is of a Contractual
Nature in the same sense that a Common-Law debt is a Contract,
and indeed it would perhaps be well to say that it is a true debt."
Thus, it is said that the law creates or implies the contract on the
facts of the case, or that the transaction makes the contract; the
act of employment or the acceptance of goods or services operates
as an assumpsit per se, or by operation of law, a promise in law is
implied. It should be realized that this figment of legal theory,
the fictitious or implied promise, was resorted to in order to meet
procedural requirements, and "is wholly aside from the real ground
of liability.""
40. 3 Leon. 161, 74 Eng. Rep. 606 (1578).
41. 2 Foundations of Legal Liability, c. XXI, Duties in the Nature of Debt 200-201
(Northport 1906).
42. Van Deusen v. Blum, 35 Mass. 229 (1836); Smith v. Lowell First Cong. Meet-
ing House. 8 Pick. (Mass.) 178 (1829).
43. 2 Street, Foundations of Legal Liability, c. XXI, Duties in the Nature of Debt
201 (Northport 1906).
44. Ibid.
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Why does the law impose the duty to pay notwithstanding the
fact that no express promise to do so has been made? The answer
is that the only fair inference to be drawn from the transaction is
that the innkeeper, the party furnishing the services, expects to be
paid, and the other party, in accepting such services, gives consent
to this condition by the act of user. Thus the contract originates
from the facts of the case, and in consequence the authorities tell
us that duties of this character are implied as of fact.
The books also point out that while the ordinary assumptual
contract is proved by words of promise, the contract implied from
the facts of the case, or as of fact, is proved by the: conduct of the
parties. "From this fact", declares Street,4 5 "the conclusion has
been erroneously drawn that the Express Assumptual Contract and
Contracts or Debts Implied as of Fact differ only in their Mode of
Proof."1 Street 7 takes the view, which seems clearly tenable, that
this constitutes a grave error in legal theory. He declares: "The
Assumptual Contract and the Contractual Duty Imposed by Law
differ fundamentally in legal principle as well as in the Mode of
Proving them. Nowhere do we find a more conspicuous illustra-
tion of the truth that things that are similar are not the same. In
one case the Duty springs from the Obligation of Promise; in the
other the Duty is Imposed by Law in the absence of Promise." The
erroneous conclusion referred to above has had some authority for
the proposition that in contracts implied as of faet the promise on
which the action of Assumpsit is allowed is an inference of fact,
provable by circumstantial evidence." But the promise is an in-
ference of law, which promise is fictitious and merely descriptive
of an obligation created by operation of law,-a fictition resorted
to in order to bridge the gap between the second and third stages
in the development of Indebitatus Assunpsit. And the proof of
this is made clear by observation of the fact that Indebitatus As-
sumpsit is the only form of Assumpsit which can be supported by
45. Id. at 202.
46. Keener, a Treatise on the Law of Quasi-Contracts, c. I, Nature and Scopeof the
Obligation 3, 5 (New York 1893). "The difference between the cases ['express con-
tracts' and 'contracts implied in fact'] is a difference simply in the kind of the evi-
dence used to establish the contract. In the one case the language of contract is in
termg used, and because of the expressions used, the contract is called an express con-
tract; whereas in the other case the contract is established by the conduct of the parties,
viewed in the light of surrounding circumstanes, and is called a contract implied in fact.
"'The terms, 'express contracts' and 'contracts implied in fact,' are used then to idi-
cate, not a distinction in the principles of contract, but a difference in the character of
the evidence by which a simple contract is proved. The source of the obligation in each
case is the intention of the parties."
47. 2 Street, Foundations of Legal Liability, c. XXI, Duties in the Nature of Debt
202 (Northport 1906).
48. Clark, Contracts 753, states: "The promise is implied, not as a matter of law,
but as a mattcr of fact."
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the implied promise; if the contract is express, written or oral, or
express in the sense of being implied in fact, the action is Special
Assumpsit.4'
In order for the remedy to be in quasi-contract, three elements
must be present. It must appear, according to Street,5° that: "(1)
There was a conferring of a benefit; (2) That the person on whom
the duty to compensate is imposed has sufficient legal capacity to
have bound himself by a Promise if such had been given; (3) That
he gives a legal assent to the conferring of the benefit." Thus,
where the "Gentleman of Quality" took lodging, the guest was of
full legal capacity and by his request for such lodging and his sub-
sequent conduct showed a consent to profit by use of the inn-
keeper's property and services, there was present the required ele-
ments. The consent and assumptual capacity brings the duty in
issue into harmony with the theory of Assumpsit and this fact ex-
plains why such contracts have been frequently viewed as implied
promises (Assumpsits) rather than as debts. They should, how-
ever, be classified as debts or duties in the nature of Debts, rather
than as Assumpsits (promises), as neither capacity nor consent is
required as a condition precedent to the imposition of the duty, as
for example, in the case of the infant or insane or drunken persons.
In such instances the law makes the contract, or imposes a legal
duty on the particular facts of the case.
Thus, if these cases be viewed from the standpoint of legal duty,
they merge into a homogeneous mass of contractual duties in the
nature of debt, indistinguishable, with the same underlying prin-
ciple of liability. But if we view these same cases from the stand-
point of assumptual obligation, they fall into two classes, to wit:
(1) the so-called implied contracts (contracts implied as of fact)
and (2) quasi-contracts (contracts implied as of law). Street com-
ments on these two types of implied contracts as follows: "Im-
plied Contracts [in the first sense] comprise Duties Imposed by
Law upon one person to compensate for a benefit conferred by an-
other, where the circumstances indicate that the parties expected
the benefit to be paid for, and where it appears that the beneficiary
had capacity to find himself by an Express Promise if he had given
one. The term Quasi-Contract [as used in the second sense] is re-
stricted to those duties to pay money or to compensate for benefits
conferred where capacity and assent51 to the imposition of ,the
49. 2 Street, Foundations of Legal Liability, c. XXI, Dtties in the Nature of Debt-
202 (Northport 1906).
50. Id. at 203.
51. The italics have been inserted for clarity.
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duty, oi either of these elements, are wanting in the person on
whom the duty is imposed." "
Such a mode of classification, that is the division of debts and
duties in the nature of debts into implied contracts and quasi-con-
tracts does not make for clear and accurate thinking. Such divis-
ion, conceived from the standpoint of assumptual theory, neverthe-
less has been used for the purpose of dividing non-assumptual
duties, with resultant confusion in legal theory. To summarize, it
may be said that the term quasi-contract may be applied to all
contractual duties which cannot be enforced by the action of debt
or the action of Special Assumpsit.
(V) Indebitatus Assumpsit as a Remedy Upon the Quantum
Meruit and Quantum Valebant Counts. - In the cases so far con-
sidered there was, at the basis of the action, some sort of agree-
ment or bargain between the parties. But there were a great num-
ber of human situations where services were rendered, goods sold
and delivered, and work and labor done by one person for the
benefit of another which did not create true common-law debt,
but where nevertheless the circumstances were such as to raise a
presumption that they were to be paid for. Prior to, the Seven-
teenth Century, such obligations, similar to, yet not quite identical
with a true common-law debt, where a sum certain was due, were
without remedy, as neither Account, Debt nor Special Assumpsit
afforded any relief. Account was not available as the obligation in-
volved did not fall within the scope of relationships covered by
that action. 3 Debt would lie as no fixed sum had been agreed
upon by the parties;" and Special Assumpsit did not fill the gap as
there was no express promise." As neither Account, Debt, nor
Special Assumpsit afforded a remedy equity for a time inter-
vened to give relief in such cases."  In this situation Indebitatus
52. Id. at 205.
53. Fifoot,History and Sources of the Common Law, c. 15, The Subsequent Develop-
ment of Assumpsit 360 (London 1949).
54. Young v. Ashburnham, 3 Leon. 161, 74 Eng. Rep. 606 (1578).
55. Ames, Lectures on Legal History, Lecture XV, Implied Assumpsit 146, 154
(Cambridge 1913). Cf. Watkins Case, Y.B. 3 Hen. VI, f. 36, pl. 33 (1425) in which.
a contrary suggestion was made, but Professor Fifoot declares that it "stands alone and
precedes by three-quarters of a century the emegence of assumpsit as a contractual
remedy." Fifoot, History and Sources of the Common Law, c. 15, The Subsequent
Decelopment of Assumpsit 358, 360 (London 1949): But see Thursby v. Warren, W.
Jones208, 82 Eng. Rep. 110 (1629); Ames, Lectures on Legal History, Lecture XV,
Iplied Assumpsit 148, 154 (Cambridge 1913 Y,
56. "The jurisdiction of the court of chancery appears to have been anciently called
into action in respect of. executory promises and implied obligations now designated
under the name of assumpsits, by reason of the courts of law nof having at first acted
upon the Statute of, Westminster 11, sai as to 'give a remedy by thd actio- ou the case, in
cases intended to be embraced within its provisions." I Spence, History of the Equitable
Jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery 694 (Philadelphia 1846). The learned writer adds
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Assumpsit was further extended in its scope through an implied
undertaking on the part of the debtor to pay a reasonable sum,
for the benefit received, and the form of declaring was substan-
tially the same. The courts in such an action were framed in such
a manner as to enable the plaintiff to recover for a benefit con-
ferred under such circumstances as did not create a true common-
law debt or an actionable Assumpsit, but where the circumstances
raised a presumption that the benefit was to be paid for. This end
was accomplished by a series of rulings by the Courts between
1609 and 1632. According to Dean Ames, the right to sue upon an
implied quantum meruit, had no recognition prior to 1609. The
first break came in 1610 in the case of Warbook v. Griffin,- which
involved an innkeeper. Said the Court: "It is an Implied Promise
of every part, that is, of the part of the innkeeper, that he will
preserved the goods of his guest, and on the part of the guest, that
he will pay all treasonable] duties and charges he caused in the
house."" '  In the same year in The Six Carpenters Case,5 9 the
benefit of this innovation was extended, and the right of a tailor
to recover so much as he deserves was clearly recognized in the
opinion of the Court. In 1682, according to Shepherd,60 reference
is made to a case where it was held that where one requested an-
other to do work for him, but made no promise to pay for the
work, the law would imply a promise, and hence he might sue for
the wages.61 Nichols v. More,62 decided in 1661, held that "the.
carrier may declare upon a Quantum Meruit, like a tailor, and.
therefore shall be charged." The final result, therefore, was that
the action came to lie upon the wholly fictitious promise which the
law implied to the debtor in those cases where the factual transac-
tion involved operated to create a debt, or, to state the matter in-
another way, in any case of a simple contract executed in such a:
that "in the time of Edward IV many suits founded on equitable assumpsits were still
instituted." In the same connection he mentions the case of the executrix of a tailor who
sued in chancery in 1567 to recover the value of clothes furnished by the tailor. The
case was referred to a queen's tailor to report what was due. On his report a decree
for payment was made. The author adds that "there were suits for wages and many
others of like nature." In the case of the executrix of the tailor the necessity for re-
sorting to equity arose chiefly, no doubt, from he fact that the tailor was dead. It had
not then been settled that the action of assumpsit could be maintained by a personal
representative. 3 Street, The Foundations of Legal Liability, c. XV, The Action of As-
sumpsit (Indebitatus Assumpsit) 182, 186, n. 7 (Northport 1906).
57. 2 Brownl. 254, 123 Eng. Rep. ,927 (1609).
58. Id. at 255, 123 Eng. Rep. at 928.
59. 8 Co. Rep. 146a, 77 Eng. Rep. 695 (1610).
60. Actions on the Case, c. I1, 50 (2d--ed. London 1675).
61. Ames, Lectures on Legal Histoty, Lecture XIV, Implied Assumpsit (155 Cain-
bridge 1913).
62. 1 Sid. 36, 82 Eng. Rep. 954 (1661).
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manner as to confer-a benefit upon one party at the expense of an-
other. The action thus developed and made applicable to all per-
sons engaged in one of the common callings was gradually recog-
nized as the normal remedy against professional men, tradesmen,
and even individuals, who had rendered some specific service for
the defendant. As thus developed the action was a special action
on the case for Debt.
And once the doctrine, was accepted that the law may raise a
promise on the facts of the case, even though they did not create
a common-law debt, the way was opened for further application
of the same principle. Thus, in Gardiner v. Bellingham,63 decided
in 1613, the quantum valebant count for goods sold and delivered,
came into vogue, being based on exactly the same principle as the
quantum meruit count. With this development, quantum meruit
was largely confined to cases for work and labor done.
6 4
Professor Fifoot suggests that the development of the action upon
a quantum meruit, raised a question as to whether the new species
was to be viewed merely as another application of the action of
Indebitatus Assumpsit, or was it to assume a place as a distinct
action, albeit a species of the parent action? The adoption of the
first view required the obligation flowing from the benefit received
and the promise to pay to be grounded upon the fact of a pre-
cedent debt. But if the scope of quantum meruit was to be gov-
erned by the scope of Debt, it was subject to the technical ob-
jection that it operated outside the range of Debt. Apparently,
therefore, the new form of action was to serve as a particular
species of Indebitatus Assumpsit. Toward the close of the Seven-
teenth Century, some doubt having arisen as to this matter, the
practice grew up under which the plaintiff was permitted to sue
alternatively upon an Indebitatus Assumpsit, where a sum certain
was claimed, and upon a quantum meruit, where only a reasonable
sum was claimed. In 1698, in the case of Smith v. Johnson,65
where the declaration was framed in the alternative, the distinction
became important, when the defendant sought to pay the money
into court and moved for a complete discharge of, his obligation,
63. Hob. 5, 80 Eng. Rep. 155 (1613). See also Boult v. Harris, 3 Keb. 469, 84
Eng. Rep. 828 (1676); Webb v. Moore, 2 Vent. 279, 86 Eng. Rep. 440, 442 (1691).
64. Fifoot, History and Sources of the Common Law, c. XV, The Subsequent Development
of Assumpsit (Quantum Meruit) 361, n. 18 (London 1949) "(1610) Cor. Jac. 262. So,
in the Six Carpenters Case (1610) 8 Coke Rep. 146a, the Court said obiter that an
action would lie against a tailor for clothes made, though no price were agreed upon; for
'the putting of his cloth to the tailor to be made into a gown is sufficient to prove the
Special Contract, for the law implies it.'
65. 12 Mod. 187, 88 Eng. Rep. 1252 (1698).
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with the result that the court indicated a willintgness to permit the
motion as to he Indebitatus Assumpsit count, but not as the
quantum meruit count.6
To BE CONTINUED
66. Wood, Institute of the Laws of England, Bk. IV, Of the Courts of Justice or
Jurisdiction of Courts, c. IV, Of the Proceedings in Suits or Civil Causes in Our Courts,
Of Actions 555, 556 (9th ed. London 1763).
